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Abstract
We explore the role of interﬁrm alliances as a mechanism for sharing technological knowledge. We
argue that knowledge ﬂows between alliance partners will be greater than ﬂows between pairs of
nonallied ﬁrms, and less than ﬂows between units within single ﬁrms. Using patent citations as a
proxy for knowledge ﬂows, we ﬁnd results that are consistent with these expectations. We then
explore how ﬁrm characteristics affect knowledge ﬂows within alliances and ﬁnd positive effects due
to technological, geographic, and business similarities between partners. We use alliance data from
MERIT, patent data from the USPTO, and ﬁrm data from Compustat.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL Classiﬁcation: Firm organization and market structure: Markets vs. hierarchies; Vertical integration (L22)
Keywords: Alliances; Technology transfer; Patents; Knowledge; Multinational companies
1. Introduction
We explore the role of interﬁrm alliances as a mechanism for sharing technological
knowledge. Because ﬁrms often form alliances to promote technology sharing, we compare
the extent and nature of knowledge ﬂows between alliance partners to analogous ﬂows
among pairs of ﬁrms that are not allied. To provide greater context for this comparison,
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E-mail address: bgc@brandeis.edu (B. Gomes-Casseres).and because it is interesting in its own right, we also compare these interﬁrm knowledge
ﬂows with ﬂows within multinational companies (MNCs).
While some knowledge ﬂow across organizations (or units of a single organization) is no
doubt accidental or involuntary, intentional ﬂows will be greater when they are in the
interest of both parties. Knowledge sharing should thus be facilitated when different units
have similar interests, and/or when contractual mechanisms reduce the scope for
opportunism in the exchange. In general, we expect that knowledge ﬂows will be the
smallest between ﬁrms that have only arm’s length relationships with each other, because
much of the ﬂows will be involuntary spillovers. At the other extreme, an MNC will often
attempt to align the interests of its distinct units so as to maximize the incentive and ability
of each to share knowledge within the ﬁrm. We view interﬁrm alliances as an intermediate
environment, in which interests are only partially aligned and opportunistic behavior only
partially regulated. Hence, the extent of knowledge ﬂow between alliance members should
be intermediate between that observed in the pure spillover environment of nonallied ﬁrms
and that realized in the integrated environment of different units of a single ﬁrm.
We use the well-known Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI)
database developed by the Maastricht Economic Research Institute in Technology
(MERIT) to identify pairs of ﬁrms that share one or more alliances with each other. We
develop various measures of the nature or intensity of the alliance relationship between
pairs of ﬁrms, such as the number of alliances they have with each other, the ages of those
alliances, and whether or not the alliance agreements explicitly incorporate joint research
and development (R&D) or equity investments. In order to examine knowledge ﬂows
between nonallied ﬁrms, we construct control pairs that consist of two ﬁrms that do not
have any alliances in common in the database. For these controls, we use only ﬁrms that
are in the CATI database, and which thus come from the same underlying universe of
organizations as the ﬁrms in the allied pairs.
We match the ﬁrms in the CATI database to the NBER Patent Citations Data File
(Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) and then use patent citations as a proxy for the ﬂow of
technological knowledge between ﬁrms. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) describe the
substantial literature that uses patent citations as a proxy for knowledge ﬂows. As will
be made more precise below, we look at the number of citations to patents of Firm Y that
are contained in the patents applied for in each year by Firm X. Controlling for the total
number of citations made in that year by Firm X’s patents, and the total stock of
potentially citable patents of Firm Y, we interpret any variable that increases this citation
ﬂow as being associated with an increased ﬂow of technological knowledge from Firm Y
(the cited ﬁrm) to Firm X (the citing ﬁrm).
The relationship of patent citations to unobserved ﬂows of technological knowledge can
be thought of by analogy to citations in academic articles, though there are important
limitations to this analogy. Like bibliographic citations, patent citations are supposed to
indicate previous work on which the current work builds or relies, or which embodies
results that are related to those of the current work. For the purpose at hand, patent
citations have the advantage that they perform a legal function related to the validity of the
patent and the technology to which it applies, so that they are not contaminated by
unnecessary citations to friends, colleagues, or famous people. However, they have the
drawback that a signiﬁcant number of citations are typically added by the patent examiner,
and hence may represent previous work of which the inventor was unaware. Survey
research reported in Chapter 12 of Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) indicates that at most half
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used. In addition, not all inventions are patented, so there are surely ﬂows of knowledge
between ﬁrms that do not show up in a patent citation. We say that patent citations are a
noisy proxy for knowledge ﬂow. It is likely, however, that the absent or extraneous
citations are largely noise. Moreover, recent research suggests that there may be some
systematic patterns in extraneous citations, e.g., there appears to be more such noise in
some technological ﬁelds than in others (Sampat, 2004; Alcacer and Gettleman, 2004). It is
unlikely, however, that these patterns would be related to the existence or absence of the
intercorporate relationships studied here, hence, aggregate ﬂows of the citations
from a relatively large number of patents can be expected to contain a meaningful signal
about knowledge ﬂow that can be used to draw inferences regarding the phenomena of
interest here.
Our primary empirical results conﬁrm the expected ordering of the magnitude of
knowledge ﬂows, being greatest within ﬁrms, less for allied ﬁrms, and much less for the
control pairs of nonallied ﬁrms. The increase in citations associated with alliance
formation is also correlated with the intensity of the alliance relationship, being greatest
for ﬁrms with alliances of extended duration, multiple alliances, and alliances with equity
or joint R&D components.
To gain insight into the circumstances under which alliances between ﬁrms seem to have
greater or lesser effects, we explore a number of aspects of the technological,
organizational, and geographic environments of the ﬁrm pairs. We ﬁnd that the knowledge
ﬂows are greatest when the ﬁrms are close to each other along several dimensions: The
alliance effect is greatest for technologically similar ﬁrms, ﬁrms in the same geographic
region, and ﬁrms in the same industry. We also ﬁnd that large ﬁrms (as measured by sales)
appear to share knowledge within alliances more than smaller ﬁrms; even after controlling
for the scale of innovative activity as measured by patent variables, the effect of alliance
formation on citation frequencies increases with the size of both the citing and potentially
cited ﬁrms. Finally, R&D-intensive ﬁrms seem to beneﬁt more from alliance membership;
the effect of alliance participation on citations is increasing in the R&D/sales ratio of the
citing ﬁrm.
These ﬁndings have potentially important implications for our understanding of the
economics of the ﬁrm. Various studies suggest that alliances can enhance the value of the
ﬁrm, especially alliances that involve the transfer or pooling of technology (e.g., Chan
et al., 1997). Our study provides a missing link between these studies and other research
that shows that a ﬁrm’s technology capability (as represented by its patents) inﬂuences its
value to investors (Hirschey and Richardson, 2004). If alliances indeed promote
technology ﬂows, then the technological capability of a ﬁrm can be enhanced by that of
its allies, and as a result, alliances can add value to the ﬁrm. Thus, our ﬁndings help explain
both why alliances sometimes complement the internal ﬁnancing of R&D (Lerner et al.,
2003), and how alliances enhance the value of equity ownership ties between ﬁrms (Allen
and Phillips, 2000).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our conceptual
approach in more detail, and relates it to key elements of the existing literature. Section 3
describes the data sources, the compilation of the samples used in the analyses, and
the construction of key variables. Section 4 provides results using varying techniques
and speciﬁcations. Section 5 offers concluding observations and suggestions for
future research.
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We deﬁne an alliance as any organizational structure used to govern an incomplete
contract between separate ﬁrms, such that each partner has limited control (Gomes-
Casseres, 1996). Alliances take different forms, from equity joint ventures to nonequity
contractual arrangements. Regardless of form, these arrangements are in some way open-
ended and contain gaps typical of incomplete contracts. As a result, to deal with
unforeseen contingencies, the partners need to make decisions jointly, although there is no
automatic convergence in their interests. The alliance structure thus enables the parties to
coordinate joint work and align interests better than arm’s length contracts. In other
words, the alliance structure can be seen as an alternative to vertical integration for dealing
with problems created by the incompleteness of contracts (Hart and Moore, 1990). This
approach is consistent with recent papers on alliances as relational contracts (Garvey,
1995; Baker et al., 2002).
2.1. Firm boundaries and alliances
Traditionally, the boundary of the ﬁrm has been deﬁned by ownership of assets with a
strict distinction being made between transactions inside and outside the ﬁrm (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975). Even so, early theorists knew that this distinction was artiﬁcial; in
a footnote, Coase notes in 1937: ‘‘[I]t is impossible to draw a hard and fast line
which determines whether there is a ﬁrm or not. There may be more or less direction’’
(pp. 386–405).
With the rising popularity of alliances as an organizational strategy, theorists have
begun to see alliances as a middle ground between the ﬁrm and the market, ‘‘blurring’’ the
boundary of the ﬁrm (Macaulay, 1963; Richardson, 1972; Williamson, 1979; Garvey, 1995;
Baker et al., 2002). Much of the theoretical and empirical research on alliances in the past
two decades explores how alliances combine attributes of ﬁrms and markets. One of the
areas in which alliances can potentially have an advantage over markets is in the pooling
and transfer of technological capabilities among separate ﬁrms. This paper is an attempt to
test this conjecture using statistical methods on a broad sample of ﬁrms.
2.2. Alliances and knowledge ﬂows
This paper focuses on two activities typically thought to be particularly subject to
problems associated with incomplete contracts, namely, technology transfer and
cooperation in the development of new technology. Because of difﬁculties in monitoring
inputs and outputs, in negotiating exchanges of value under conditions of uncertainty and
asymmetric information, and in enforcing contracts in relation to intangible assets, these
activities are typically conducted more efﬁciently, and at lower transaction costs within an
integrated ﬁrm than between unrelated ﬁrms (Teece, 1986). Because alliances facilitate the
governance of incomplete contracts, we expect that when ﬁrms use alliances to transfer
technology and cooperate in technological development, these transaction costs would be
lower than for unrelated ﬁrms (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991), though they still may be higher
than if the ﬁrms were fully integrated.
In sum, we expect that more technology transfer and more cooperative technological
development would take place between allied ﬁrms than within a comparable pair of
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than between different units of an integrated ﬁrm. Thus, we expect to ﬁnd an increase in a
ﬁrm’s patent citation intensity as we move from patents of an unafﬁliated ﬁrm, to patents
of an allied ﬁrm, to the ﬁrm’s own patents.
Not all alliances lead to knowledge ﬂows and not all are intended to do so. There is
much disagreement in the alliance literature about whether knowledge transfer in alliances
is the rule or the exception. One side in this debate claims that alliances are all about
learning, leading to the possibility that partners engage in learning races with each other or
appropriate knowledge from each other opportunistically (Mankin and Reich, 1986;
Khanna et al., 1998). The other side argues that precisely because of the competitive
tensions that learning entails, ﬁrms in most alliances intend to co-specialize. That is, rather
than the ﬁrms seeking to absorb the knowledge of the partner, each will focus on
deepening its own knowledge in a way that complements the knowledge of its partner
(Hennart, 2000).
In an ideal world, we would focus our study on alliances intended by their members to
facilitate the exchange of technological knowledge, and we would ignore those in which no
such attempt is made. However, the data offer only a crude indication as to the purpose of
each alliance. We therefore use this information, together with empirical strategies
discussed below, to try to focus our examination on those alliances that we intended to
facilitate knowledge ﬂow. Of course, to the extent that the data continue to be
contaminated by alliances motivated by other purposes, our measures of alliance
impact will understate the magnitude of that impact for the subset intended to facilitate
knowledge ﬂow.
2.3. Organization of the multinational company
While we view the integrated ﬁrm as a benchmark against which to compare knowledge
ﬂows in alliances, a wide range of characteristics of the integrated ﬁrm could affect internal
knowledge ﬂows. Because our data contain mostly large MNCs, it is useful to recognize the
role of technology ﬂows within MNCs. As is well known, an MNC must have a
competitive advantage over local ﬁrms in order to overcome the liability of foreignness.
This competitive advantage often consists of advanced and proprietary knowledge that is
costly to transfer to the foreign location through pure market transactions. Otherwise, we
would not observe an MNC, but rather international trade, cross-border licensing, and
other forms of international business. Technology ﬂows thus play a central role in the very
existence of MNCs (see the review in Caves, 1996). A recent study by Singh (2003) that
also uses patent citations as a proxy for technology ﬂows ﬁnds that MNCs are not
disadvantaged in accessing technology from host-country ﬁrms, and conﬁrms that cross-
border technology ﬂows within the MNC are much stronger than ﬂows between ﬁrms,
even for ﬁrms located in the same country.
However, several managerial studies of the MNC emphasize that these global ﬁrms
cannot be seen as a single entity with a single center of control—foreign subsidiaries have
power that is distinct from and counterbalanced by the power of headquarters. This local
power is based on the information, local connections, tacit knowledge, and other
intangibles that are important to a ﬁrm. As a result, the MNC is best seen as a network of
entities that are owned by a single parent, but not controlled unilaterally by the parent
headquarters (see, e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).
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necessarily fully aligned incentives leads us to conceptualize the difference between an
alliance and a ﬁrm as a matter of degree rather than of kind. The different units of an
MNC may or may not always work to bring about efﬁcient knowledge exchange, but it is
reasonable to expect that they do a better job at this kind of coordination than
organizational units linked only by an alliance agreement. On the other hand, some
observers suggest cross-border alliances are ideal for tapping into multiple sources of
knowledge in different countries. Branstetter (2002), for example, examines the role of
R&D alliances and foreign direct investment (FDI) in facilitating knowledge ﬂow between
the U.S. and Japan. Still, there is little systematic evidence of the relative abilities of MNCs
and alliances to transfer knowledge across countries.
The main implication of these ideas for our study is that our self-citation pairs represent
much more than a simple identiﬁcation of citing and cited ﬁrms. Rather, these pairs usually
represent large organizations that span multiple countries and conduct technological
development in multiple locations. Unfortunately, our patent information is not
sufﬁciently ﬁne-grained to disentangle relevant characteristics of the ﬁrms; indeed, our
primary measure of geographic location of the entity is the home base of the ﬁrm. Simple
statistics of the source of invention of the ﬁrms in our sample conﬁrms that the vast
majority of inventions are made in the home country of the ﬁrm. While many might debate
what exactly is the home country of a ﬁrm such as IBM, the fact remains that even for this
most global of ﬁrms, 60% of its patents originate in the United States. A related
implication is that ﬁrms from different regions may behave differently, both in their self-
citations and in their alliance citations.
2.4. Geographic boundaries and technology diffusion
Aside from drawing on research about alliances and MNCs, we also use ideas from the
literature on technology diffusion across geographic space. A number of studies ﬁnd that
technology ﬂows to nearby locations are greater and faster than ﬂows to more distant
locations (Jaffe et al., 1993; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996). A few recent studies of
technology diffusion also evaluate the role of organizational linkages. These studies
usually argue that organizational linkages may reduce communication costs and thus
promote the ﬂow of knowledge across locations (Mowery et al., 1996; Branstetter, 2002).
From another angle, the alliance literature has long been concerned with the effect of
geographic differences between partners in an alliance. Much of the work in business
alliances stems from an interest in international alliances, the arena in which joint ventures
and other inter-ﬁrm arrangements ﬁrst gained popularity (Stopford and Wells, 1972;
Contractor and Lorange, 1988). This literature sees alliances as a way to facilitate cross-
border technology transfer—a claim that has long inﬂuenced host-government foreign
investment and industrial policy strategies.
2.5. An integrated approach
Notwithstanding the fact that each of the streams of research described so far is well
established, they are seldom combined in empirical work. To our knowledge, there are no
studies that test the interaction of the organizational and geographic variables just
described. Fig. 1 helps one visualize the range of interactions between these variables.
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alliance citations, which in turn will be more likely than citations among unrelated pairs.
Second, within-country citations will be more likely than cross-country citations,
regardless of organizational form. This leads to our expectations about the ordinal
ranking of citation probabilities across geographies and organizational ﬁrms as shown in
Fig. 1.
What is noteworthy and potentially of importance to managers is that the ranking
between diagonal pairs of cells in Fig. 1 is not determined by the ordinal rankings shown.
For example, will a ﬁrm prefer within-country, cross-ﬁrm citations over cross-country,
within-ﬁrm citations, or, what is the best avenue to acquire or share a given technology? As
a concrete example, consider the choice that an Intel unit in the United States might have if
it needs a technology that is available from a local partner as well as from its own foreign
subsidiary. Will it be more costly (in organizational terms) to obtain that technology from
the local partner (through an alliance) or from the Intel subsidiary (across geographic
borders)? The answer is likely to be an empirical question, and one that has not been
addressed so far.
A broad way to conceptualize these ideas is to hypothesize that any dimension of
distance that increases communication costs will reduce or delay technology diffusion, that
is, ﬁrms that are geographically, technologically, organizationally, economically, or
otherwise more distant will tend to communicate less, all else equal. The formation of an
alliance and the intensiﬁcation of an alliance relationship between two ﬁrms can be
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simply a restatement of the basic hypotheses laid out above. The interesting question is
whether—and in what direction—these distance effects interact with one another. One
might imagine that alliance formation would be particularly useful to overcome handicaps
deriving from distance along other dimensions. If the purpose of alliances is to gain
efﬁcient access to knowledge that would otherwise be hard to obtain because of geographic
or technological distance, then we would expect the augmentation in communication
associated with alliance formation to be greatest for ﬁrms that are distant along these
dimensions. We ﬁnd, however, the opposite—the beneﬁt of alliance formation is greatest
for ﬁrms that are already proximate along other dimensions.
3. Data, samples, and variables
We use data from three major sources: (1) The CATI database, which provides the
members and certain characteristics of alliances; (2) the NBER patent database, which
offers the patents and patent citations of ﬁrms; and, (3) the Standard and Poors
Compustat database, which contains R&D, sales, and other economic information about
ﬁrms. We analyze citations on an annual basis from 1975 to 1999. Our three data sources
do not share a common ﬁrm index, so combining these three sources of information
requires matching the ﬁrms in the different databases on the basis of the ﬁrm names as
recorded in each. Our primary sample consists of all of the ﬁrms and alliance pairs that we
are able to match between the CATI and patent databases, as described below.
To reduce complexity in the merging procedure as well as in the interpretation of results,
we use only alliance and patent data from information technology sectors, which include
computers, communications, semiconductors, and related materials—a previous industry
study suggests that alliances and MNCs played important roles in the international
transfer of knowledge in these ﬁelds during the period under study (Gomes-Casseres,
1993).
3.1. Linking patent and alliance data
The CATI and NBER databases are combined by matching the ﬁrm names. We begin
with 2,637 ﬁrms in the alliance data set and 175,116 patenting organizations (‘‘assignees’’).
The names of alliance members are matched to names of USPTO assignees using both a
computer algorithm and case-by-case reviews. First, we use an algorithm to strip the text
strings of punctuation and capitalization and to identify word-for-word matches between
the names found in the two datasets. This algorithm succeeds in matching roughly a
quarter of the names. We then modify the algorithm so that it matches the ﬁrst three words
of the names, then the ﬁrst two, and ﬁnally the ﬁrst word of the names. We then examine
each of these matches manually, which results in matching about half of the names.
Finally, we match the remaining names by manually searching for key words. In the end,
we succeed in matching 1,785 alliance names to patent assignees (68% of allied entities).
These ﬁrms represent 4,839, or 77%, of the 6,290 alliance relationships. The matched ﬁrms
are involved in a disproportionate share of alliance relationships because larger ﬁrms are
more likely to patent (and therefore be found in the patent database), and also tend, on
average, to be involved in more alliance relationships. In some cases, there is more than
one name in either the alliance data or the patent data that appears to match a single name
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memberships of the multiple names into an aggregated entity. For example, several names
from the alliance data set are combined to form an aggregated entity called ‘‘GE’’ that is
then matched to patent data. This means aggregating the ‘‘GE’’ entity names appearing in
the original alliance data; General Electric Company, GE/Calma, GE/Storno, as well as
the USPTO assignees; General Electric Company, GE Chemicals, Inc., GE Company,
General Electric Canada Inc., General Electric CBR SA, General Electric CGE SA,
General Electric CGR SA, and Calma Company. The inclusion of the USPTO assignee
‘‘Calma Company’’ reﬂects the fact that while there is no assignee called ‘‘GE/Calma,’’
there are USPTO assignees that match ‘‘GE’’ and ‘‘Calma’’ separately. In such cases where
there is no exact match for what appears to be a combination of names matching assignees,
the amalgamated name is matched to both patent assignees.
Once this procedure is complete, we drop ﬁrms that do not have at least one patent in an
information technology (IT) ﬁeld. Patents in these ﬁelds fall into classes corresponding to
technologies used in Communications, Computer Hardware & Software, Computer
Peripherals, Information Storage, and Semiconductor Devices (subcategories 21–24 and 46
in Hall et al., 2002). Once ﬁrms without patents in these classes are eliminated, we are left
with 975 ﬁrms.
It is natural to wonder to what extent our sample of IT alliances and their member ﬁrms
are representative of the universe of alliances. First, to the extent that the universe contains
many alliances that are not motivated by technology transfer, we do not wish to represent
that universe. However, it is reasonable to ask whether the IT alliance sample is
representative of high-technology R&D alliances in other sectors such as pharmaceuticals,
aerospace, or advanced materials. The labor-intensive nature of the matching process
(combined with the ﬁnite nature of resources) precludes the construction of a
comprehensive match between the ﬁrms in the CATI database and the patent database.
Without such a match, we cannot really compare the ﬁrms and alliances in the IT sector to
those in other sectors. Nonetheless, the IT alliances represent 40% to 50% of all alliances
in the database over the period, so they are clearly an important fraction of the overall
story. We can also compare IT alliances and their members to all high-tech alliances in the
database. There are not large differences between the IT alliances that we use and the other
high-technology alliances in the database with respect to the average number of ﬁrms per
alliance (2.2 for both groups), the number of alliances in which the average ﬁrm
participates (3.1 for ﬁrms in IT alliances; 2.8 for other high-tech ﬁrms), the fraction
involving equity (20% for IT; 23% for other high-tech), or the fraction of alliances
involving a U.S. company (74% for IT; 66% for other high-tech). While this does not
conﬁrm, of course, that the IT alliances behave in the same way as other alliances, it does
suggest that they are a large, and apparently representative, component of the overall
story.
3.2. Panel data on ﬁrm pairs over time
The 975 ﬁrms in the matched alliance/patent database are key in the creation of a
database in which each observation is a unique ﬁrm pair. Because we are interested in the
direction of technology ﬂow, each alliance relationship generates two directional pairs
in the database, e.g., IBM-Apple with IBM as citing ﬁrm and Apple as cited ﬁrm, and
Apple-IBM, with the reverse. To examine a ﬁrm’s citations to its own patents, we create a
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nonallied pairs from the same set of ﬁrms, drawn from pairs that have no alliances in any
year; these control or nonallied pairs are used to measure knowledge ﬂows through market
transactions. The number of control pairs is equal to the number of allied pairs.
Our ﬁnal sample contains over 7,000 pairs of citing and cited companies that are one of
three types: Nonallied pairs (about 3,000), allied pairs (about 3,000), and self-pairs (975).
From these 7,000 pairs, we construct a panel data set consisting of annual observations for
the period 1975 to 1999, with alliance formation, citation, and other variables deﬁned by
year. The total sample includes 160,901 pair-year observations, but this set includes a large
number of pairs for which there are no citations. The panel is unbalanced, because in some
years either the citing or cited ﬁrm does not have any patents, thus there could not possibly
be any citations between them.
There are both conceptual and practical difﬁculties with analysis based on this full
sample, given approximately three-quarters of the observations have zero citations. First,
as discussed above, we want to limit ourselves to those alliances that intended to foster
knowledge ﬂow; a sample in which so many of the observations indicate no ﬂow is
problematic for this purpose. Second, as mentioned above, patent citations are at best a
noisy indicator of knowledge ﬂow. Extracting meaning from differences between zero and
small numbers of citations is therefore difﬁcult. (Indeed, preliminary analysis using both
probit and negative binomial models to examine the zero-rich complete dataset yields
unstable results.)
The rest of this paper therefore uses the main analysis sample that contains 40,898
observations for which there is at least one citation between the ﬁrms in the pair, and the
results in this paper are to be interpreted as estimates of the effects of the independent
variables on knowledge ﬂows, conditional on there being a minimal level of ﬂow. This
formulation also facilitates construction of the models in the familiar log-log form, in
which effects of the independent variables are multiplicative and the coefﬁcients can be
interpreted as elasticities. The means and standard deviations of the most important
variables are shown in Table 1; deﬁnitions of all variables are summarized in the Appendix.
The NBER patent database contains identifying information that can be used to match
a subset of the patenting ﬁrms to the Compustat data ﬁle. This match is based on the
ownership of each of the patenting entities in a pair according to the Directory of
Corporate Afﬁliation in 1989 (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). Because Compustat contains
mostly U.S. ﬁrms and the CATI database contains ﬁrms from all countries (including
many small ﬁrms), the merged subsample is considerably smaller than the main sample. Of
the 829 ﬁrms used in the analysis sample, 128 are successfully matched to Compustat data
(15%). Of the 7,583 allied and control pairs in the analysis sample, 1,160 consist of ﬁrms
that are matched to Compustat. This set of successfully matched pairs produces a panel
data set over time that consists of 8,917 pair-year observations (22% of the pair-year
observations in the main panel set).
3.3. Variables: patent citations and related measures
We use a number of variables derived from the patent data. The main independent
variable is the number of citations from citing to cited ﬁrm in a given year. An important
control variable based on the patent data is the total number of citations made by the
citing ﬁrm in a given year; this variable controls for the overall size of the citing activity of
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the size of the stock of previously granted patents of the cited ﬁrm in a given year. With
these controls in place, we interpret the coefﬁcients on the other independent variables as
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for citation pairs, by relationship between paired ﬁrms
The main analysis sample, shown in Panel A below, consists of 8,077 directional pairs of ﬁrms in which we
measure the number of citations in each year from the citing ﬁrm to the cited ﬁrm. Of these pairs, 5,116 are ﬁrms
that have no alliance with each other in the sample, 2,467 are ﬁrms that have at least one alliance, and 494 are
pairs such that the ﬁrm cites itself. The main panel set contains a total of 40,898 pair-year observations. A second
sample is constructed by merging Compustat data. This sample had 1,160 directional pairs, as shown in Panel B
below. Means and standard deviations of variables are shown by subsample. The variables shown are: number of
citations from citing to cited ﬁrm in year t; total citations of citing ﬁrm in year t; patent stock of cited ﬁrm in year
t; percent of patents of cited ﬁrm that are less than three years old; percent of patents of cited ﬁrm that are between
3 and 7 years old; technological proximity of the citing and cited ﬁrms; a dummy equal to one if ﬁrms in the pair
are from the same geographic region (U.S., Europe, Japan, Rest of World); a dummy equal to one if ﬁrms had an
alliance in or before year t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an alliance within 3 years of t; a dummy equal to
one if the ﬁrms had an alliance 3–5 years before t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an alliance more than 6
years before t; and, a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an intensive alliance (see text, Section 4.1).
All pairs Nonallied Pairs Allied pairs
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Main analysis sample
No. of citations from citing to cited ﬁrm in t 12.5 63.1 5.2 13.0 17.1 41.8
Total citations of citing ﬁrm in t 802 1,717 644 1,424 1,249 2,232
Patent stock of cited ﬁrm in t 1,380 1,934 1,187 1,667 1,976 2,361
% Cited stock o3 years old in t 34% 20% 33% 20% 34% 19%
% Cited stock 3–7 years old in t 36% 13% 36% 14% 36% 12%
Technological proximity 52% 28% 45% 24% 52% 23%
Firms in pair are from same region 59% 49% 50% 50% 63% 48%
1 if ﬁrms had alliance in or before t 15% 47% 100% 0%
1 if alliance o3 years before t 32% 35% 45% 50%
1 if alliance 3–5 years before t 5% 22% 16% 37%
1 if alliance 6+ years before t 16% 36% 49% 50%
Intensive alliance 7% 25% 21% 41%
Number of directional pairs 8,077 5,116 2,467
Number of pair-year observations 40,898 27,686 13,212
Panel B: Compustat sample
No. of citations from citing to cited ﬁrm in t 16.5 44.0 8.0 19.9 26.7 60.0
Total citations of citing ﬁrm in t 1,066 1,985 758 1,605 1,436 2,310
Patent stock of cited ﬁrm in t 1,573 1,983 1,318 1,703 1,879 2,237
% Cited stock o3 years old in t 35% 18% 33% 18% 36% 18%
% Cited stock 3–7 years old in t 35% 10% 36% 11% 34% 9%
Technological proximity 46% 24% 43% 24% 49% 23%
Firms in pair are from same region 86% 35% 84% 37% 88% 33%
1 if ﬁrms had alliance in or before t 45% 50% 100% 0%
1 if alliance o3 years before t 23% 42% 50% 50%
1 if alliance 3–5 years before t 7% 26% 15% 36%
1 if alliance 6+ years before t 21% 40% 46% 50%
Intensive alliance 10% 30% 21% 41%
Number of directional pairs 1,160 610 550
Number of pair-year observations 8,917 4,874 4,043
B. Gomes-Casseres et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 80 (2006) 5–33 15effects on the likelihood that a given citation made by the citing ﬁrm will be made to a
given patent of the cited ﬁrm (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996).
Two additional control variables based on the patent data are the age of the citable
patent stock and the technological similarity of the patent portfolios of the ﬁrms in a pair.
Previous studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms cite patents that are three to seven years old more often
than younger patents or older patents (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996): As such, we include
variables that measure the percentage of patents in these age categories in the citable stock
of patents. Several previous studies also ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to cite other ﬁrms that are
active in similar technology domains. Thus, we use a measure of technological proximity
that is by now fairly common in the literature. First introduced by Jaffe (1986), this
measure is deﬁned as the angular separation of the patent class distribution vectors of the
two ﬁrms, which is the scalar product of these vectors normalized by their scalar products
with themselves, so that the measure takes the value of unity for any two identical vectors.
The distribution vectors are deﬁned over the approximately 500 patent classes deﬁned by
the USPTO (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).
Since patent citations are only a proxy for the knowledge ﬂow between ﬁrms, we must
consider whether artifactual sources of variation in citation rates bias the results. A
complete set of year dummies is used in all regressions, in order to control for possible
changes over time in the average propensity to cite. The most important remaining source
of bias in the data derives from a peculiarity of the rules for citation. In order to achieve
patent protection for an invention in different countries, the inventor must apply
separately to different patent ofﬁces. For example, the most important and valuable
inventions will typically be protected by a U.S. patent, a Japanese patent, and a patent
granted by the European patent ofﬁce. Our data include only U.S. patents and citations
made to other U.S. patents. Because important inventions, regardless of origin, are likely
to be patented in the U.S., the limitation to U.S. patents is probably not a serious one. If,
however, the U.S. patent examiner determines that a citation to a previous invention is
necessary, in some cases, that obligation can be satisﬁed by citing either the U.S. patent
document covering that invention or a foreign patent document covering the same
invention. Unfortunately, the citations to foreign patent documents are not in the
computerized patent data. It seems likely that the origin of the invention affects the
likelihood that a citation, if made, will be made to the foreign patent document rather than
to the U.S. document; this introduces a bias in our data, because the data are limited to
citations to U.S. documents. In particular, the likelihood that a Japanese company would
cite the Japanese patent document rather than the U.S. document is probably higher than
for a U.S. company. This means that comparisons of citation probabilities for companies
from different countries cannot be used to reliably measure the magnitude of knowledge
ﬂows within and between different countries. (Indeed, preliminary tests comparing citation
patents of U.S., Japanese, and European ﬁrms suggests that U.S. ﬁrms cite other U.S.
ﬁrms more often than Japanese and European ﬁrms cite other ﬁrms in their own regions.)
In our analysis, we include dummy variables for the home country of the citing and cited
ﬁrms. Because of the foreign patent citation problem, the coefﬁcients on these variables
cannot be interpreted in terms of effects on knowledge ﬂows. What interests us most,
however, is the extent to which the effects of alliances interact with these geographic
variables. We cannot think of any reason why the bias associated with our inability to
count citations to foreign patent documents should differ in any way as between allied and
nonallied ﬁrms—one might expect that the bias is purely a result of the patent strategies
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controls and to not interpret their ﬁrst-order effects; however, we do interpret the effects of
geographic variables when they appear as interactions with alliance variables.
More generally, because the behavior underlying the relationship between patent
citations and knowledge ﬂows is complex, there will always be the possibility that results
based on patent citations are biased because the independent variable affects citation
behavior rather than knowledge ﬂow. In general, we believe that most variations in citation
practices are not correlated with the economic variables of interest here, and hence they do
not introduce bias. Even if such a bias does exist, however, it still does not undermine the
results regarding the differential behavior of allied and nonallied ﬁrms, unless the
correlation of economic variables and citation practices extends beyond the individual
behavior of the citing ﬁrm to encompass some kind of connection to the allied ﬁrm or to
the propensity to form alliances. Because we think that such connections are implausible,
we are conﬁdent that the results regarding the effects of alliances on citation frequencies
are unlikely to be biased by the peculiarities of the citation process itself.
3.4. Variables: measures of alliance
Our measures of alliance activity between citing and cited ﬁrms come from the CATI
database developed at MERIT. This database now covers over 20,000 national and
international interﬁrm agreements formed between 1970 and 1999 (the ﬁrst phase of data
collection is described in Hagedoorn, 1993; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1993). For every
alliance, we have the year of formation, but the data rarely report a year of termination,
even though it is well known that most alliances end or are replaced after a few years. As a
consequence, we expect that the effect of an alliance on knowledge ﬂows between two ﬁrms
will be felt in the ﬁrst years after the alliance is formed, and then will erode over time. In
our analysis, we attempt to measure this effect by including dummy variables that indicate
when an alliance is two years old or younger, when it is three to ﬁve years old, and when it
is six or more years old.
We also know from the data when two ﬁrms have more than one alliance, either in the
same year or in successive years. Such repeated alliances can be interpreted in two ways,
both of which represent a deeper relationship between the ﬁrms than if the pair only had
one alliance. The ﬁrst interpretation is that successive alliances indicate a repeated game
and a live relationship contract. When alliances are repeated in this way, the ﬁrms can be
expected to have a stronger and longer-term underlying relationship than if their alliances
were one-off deals. The second interpretation is that having more than one alliance in
successive years or in the same year indicates a multipoint relationship, such that the ﬁrms
engage in cooperation on several fronts or in several businesses. This too is a proxy for a
deeper relationship than otherwise (Doz and Hamel, 1998). To measure the effects of these
kinds of relationships, we use a set of dummy variables to indicate when a pair has one to
two alliances, three to six alliances, or seven or more alliances. In some tests, we also use a
dummy variable that simply measures whether the ﬁrms have any alliance at all by the year
of citation.
One additional set of dummy variables that measure the nature of the alliance is drawn
directly from the CATI database. For most observations, the database indicates certain
features of the alliance structure, in particular, whether the alliance structure includes joint
R&D or whether the agreement involves equity investment from either ﬁrm into a joint
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have either, both, or neither characteristics. We use dummy variables to measure each of
these possibilities.
A broad way to think about all these alliance variables is that they are attempts to
measure the intensity of the relationship between the partners. We ﬁnd, in fact, that the
various indicators of intensity have effects in the same direction—the more intensive the
alliance, as measured by various proxies, the higher the citation frequencies between
partners. Based on these ﬁndings, we construct a composite variable to separate more-
intensive from less-intensive alliances, and we use that variable in further tests.
3.5. Variables: ﬁrm characteristics
Aside from patent citation variables and the organizational relationship variables, we
use variables that measure various characteristics of the ﬁrms in a pair. One of these is the
national origin of a ﬁrm; our measure of nationality is simple, but it has powerful effects.
For each ﬁrm, the CATI data deﬁne the ﬁrm’s nationality, that is, the home country of the
ﬁrm’s management headquarters. As mentioned above, these home-country designations
correspond closely to where the ﬁrm has the bulk of its innovative activity, as measured by
USPTO patent data. So for all intents and purposes, our nationality variables can be
considered to have been drawn either from the CATI or USPTO data.
In our tests, we use regional aggregations of the home-country variables, i.e. we identify
separately ﬁrms in the United States, Europe, Japan, and the rest of the world (emerging
markets, Australia, Canada, and such). It is worth recognizing here something that is
obvious but that has implications for our analysis: The Europe variable aggregates ﬁrms
from different home countries, while the U.S. and Japan variables represent ﬁrms from
single countries. Based on these regional variables, we deﬁne a dummy variable that
indicates whether the two ﬁrms in a pair are from the same or different regions (e.g.,
Europe–Japan or U.S.–Japan).
Other ﬁrm characteristics are derived from Compustat, namely, aggregate sales, R&D
expenditures, and the main SIC categories of each ﬁrm. Sales is used as a measure of
overall ﬁrm size, and the R&D-to-sales ratio is employed as a measure of the R&D
intensity of the ﬁrm. When merging the Compustat and CATI/NBER data, we drop any
ﬁrms for which Compustat does not report R&D expenditures; this is not a common issue
for ﬁrms in our industries. The three-digit SIC of each ﬁrm is used to construct a
dichotomous variable that indicates whether the two ﬁrms in an allied or control pair are
in the same industry.
4. Models and results
We begin with tests comparing the frequency of citation in pairs of nonallied ﬁrms, in
pairs with alliances of varying degrees of intensity, and within ﬁrms. We then examine how
the observed alliance effect varies with attributes of the ﬁrms and of ﬁrm pairs.
4.1. Base models: effects of organizational linkages
Tests of our basic hypotheses about the effects of organizational linkages on knowledge
ﬂows are presented in Table 2. These base models examine how the log of the citation ﬂow
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Table 2
Effects of alliance relationship on citations between ﬁrms in a pair
To estimate the effects of various types of alliance relationships, we use the whole sample of 40,898 pair years
and OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the log of the number of citations from citing ﬁrm to cited ﬁrm in
year t. Independent variables are: total citations of citing ﬁrm in year t; patent stock of cited ﬁrm in year t; percent
of patents of cited ﬁrm that are less than 3 years old; percent of patents of cited ﬁrm that are between 3 and 7 years
old; technological proximity of the citing and cited ﬁrms; a dummy equal to one if ﬁrms in the pair are from the
same geographic region (U.S., Europe, Japan, Rest of World); a dummy equal to one if the pair is a self pair (i.e.,
ﬁrm citing itself); a dummy equal to one if ﬁrms in the pair had an alliance in or before year t; a dummy equal to
one if the ﬁrms had an alliance within 3 years of t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an alliance 3–5 years
before t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an alliance more than 6 years before t; a dummy equal to one if the
ﬁrms had 1–2 alliances before t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had 3–6 alliances in or before t; a dummy equal
to one if the ﬁrms had 7 or more alliances in or before t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an R&D alliance
before t; a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms had an equity alliance before t; and, a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms
had an intensive alliance (see text, Section 4.1). The models shown use different sets of dummies to describe
aspects of the alliance between allied ﬁrms. Standard errors are in parentheses. Full set of year dummies are
included in the regressions, but are not shown here.
Dependent variable: log of no. of citations from citing to cited ﬁrm in t
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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% Cited stock o3 years old in t 0.051 0.019 0.029 0.021 0.030
(0.022)
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1 if alliance o3 years before t 0.124
(0.012)
***
1 if alliance 3 5 years before t 0.191
(0.019)
***
1 if alliance 6+ years before t  0.035
(0.012)
***
1 if 1–2 alliances in or before t 0.004
(0.010)
1 if 3–6 alliances in or before t 0.315
(0.018)
***
1 if 7+ alliances in or before t 0.629
(0.040)
***
1 if joint R&D in an alliance before t 0.113
(0.010)
***
B. Gomes-Casseres et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 80 (2006) 5–33 19varies with patent control variables, technological and geographic proximity, and
measures of the organizational relationship between the ﬁrms in the pair.
These results are robust across the models and are generally consistent with our
hypotheses. The coefﬁcients on the alliance variables are on average positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at 95% or 99% levels and their relative sizes are for the most part
consistent with our hypotheses regarding the effects of organizational form.
Because the alliance variables are all dummies, the coefﬁcients are average percentage
differences between a given group and the reference group, which in this case is the group
of nonallied pairs. For example, the coefﬁcient on the alliance dummy in Model 1 implies
that ﬁrms that have at least one alliance have, on average, 6% more citations than ﬁrms
with no alliances, after controlling for the other variables. The coefﬁcient on self-citation
implies that ﬁrms cite themselves approximately 131% more than they cite ﬁrms with
which they have no relationship. By comparison, the alliance effect seems small; however,
Models 2 and 3 show that the effect of alliance varies substantially by alliance age and
intensity. Model 2 implies that ﬁrms with alliances that are three to ﬁve years old have 19%
more citations than nonallied ﬁrms, and Model 3 implies that ﬁrms with seven or more
alliances have 63% more citations.
Further perspective on the magnitude of these effects comes from comparing them to the
effects of technological and geographic distance, measured here by our proximity
variables. The coefﬁcient on technological proximity is approximately 1.4 in all of the
models. This means that a hypothetical pair of ﬁrms with identical technology proﬁles
(proximity of unity) has 140% more citations than a pair whose technology distributions
are orthogonal (proximity of zero). The mean technological proximity is about 0.5; the
interquartile range is also about 0.5. Thus, the difference in citation frequency between a
pair with seven or more alliances and a nonallied pair (about 63%) is similar to the
difference between a nonallied pair at the 25th percentile in technological proximity and a
nonallied pair at the 75th percentile in technological proximity (half of 140% or 70%).
The effect of geographic proximity is measured by the dummy that indicates whether the
ﬁrms in a pair are based in the same region or not; at about 18%, this effect is considerably
smaller than the effect of technological proximity. It is likely, however, that this estimate is




Dependent variable: log of no. of citations from citing to cited ﬁrm in t
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5













R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
**Signiﬁcant at 5%;
***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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in the same region. This means that if we compare rates of cross-ﬁrm citation to rates of
self-citation, including the inherent technological and geographic proximity of a ﬁrm to
itself, the differences are large. Adding together the pure self-citation effect (115%), the
difference attributable to technological proximity of unity rather than the mean of 0.5
(70%), and the difference attributable to being in the same region rather than different
regions (18%), we ﬁnd that ﬁrms are about three times as likely to cite themselves as are
nonallied ﬁrms of typical technological proximity originating in different home countries.
The coefﬁcients of control variables are also consistent with our expectations. There is a
strong scale effect, which we model with linear and quadratic terms for the number of
citations of the citing ﬁrm and the number of patents in the patent stock of the cited ﬁrm.
Patents that are three to seven years old are cited more often than younger or older
patents, and pairs of ﬁrms in the same region cite each other more often than pairs in
different regions. The orders of magnitude of the patent-age effect and the regional effect
are similar to that of the alliance effect.
Model 4 examines whether the type of alliance affects citation behavior. It shows that
ﬁrms linked by one or more equity alliances and ﬁrms that have one or more alliances that
explicitly involve joint R&D are, in each case, 10 to15% more likely to cite each other than
if they were not allied at all. These effects are additive, implying that pairs with an equity
alliance and joint R&D have 25% more citations than nonallied ﬁrms.
Taken together, the results of Models 1–4 indicate that increasing the length, depth, and
focus of the alliance relationship all enhance knowledge ﬂow, as measured by citations. In
order to explore further how this alliance effect varies in different circumstances, it is
convenient to derive a single measure of the intensity of the alliance relationship that can
then be interacted with other variables in a way that is relatively straightforward to
interpret. Theory does not tell us the best form for such a variable. But based on the
results in Models 1–4, we construct a summary measure that is deﬁned as the sum of the
R&D and equity dummies multiplied by a dummy indicating whether the pair has three
or more alliances. This variable is zero for any pair-year combination that has no previous
R&D or equity alliances, or for which the total number of alliances as of that year is
fewer than three; this variable is unity for ﬁrms that have at least one previous R&D or
equity alliance, or which in a given year have had three or more alliances. This
dichotomous variable thereby divides the data into pairs that represent either intensive
alliances or all others. Model 5 in Table 2 shows that, all else equal, pairs of ﬁrms that are
intensively allied have 36% more citations than the rest of the pairs in the sample.
This represents a value that is clearly of economic signiﬁcance, while remaining, as we
would expect, well below the approximately 130% increase associated with citation within
the ﬁrm.
Table 3 explores the robustness of these results across different estimation methods. The
data comprise an unbalanced panel of (directionally distinguished) pairs over time.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is therefore potentially inefﬁcient, and potentially
biased if there are unobserved pair characteristics that are correlated with the independent
variables. To explore this possibility, Table 3 presents random effects and ﬁxed effects
estimation results for selected models. In general, the random effects results are statistically
and qualitatively similar to the OLS results, though there is some tendency toward
quantitatively smaller alliance effects using random effects estimation. The only exception
is Model 4, in which the random effects approach eliminates the effect of joint R&D and
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B. Gomes-Casseres et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 80 (2006) 5–33 23greatly attenuates the effect of equity alliances. For the summary variable indicating an
intensive alliance, the random effects result is about 28%, just slightly smaller than the
36% for the OLS estimate.
The ﬁxed effects estimates do suggest that there are unobserved pair effects that are
positively correlated with the tendency to form alliances. Those alliance effects that can be
estimated are all smaller using the ﬁxed effects approach, with the impact of the summary
measure of intensive alliance falling to about 11%. It is still, however, statistically different
from zero. Since other effects such as those of self-citation and technological proximity
cannot be estimated in the ﬁxed effects model, there is no obvious benchmark against
which to compare this effect to determine whether it is big or small. Since it is, however,
purely a within pair effect—estimated off of the difference in yearly citation intensity when
ﬁrms change their alliance status—a roughly 10% increase appears to be economically
important.
4.2. Interactions of alliance effect with ﬁrm and pair characteristics
The results of the previous subsection show a clear pattern of increased knowledge ﬂow,
as measured by citations, for ﬁrms in alliance relationships as compared to nonallied ﬁrms.
The next question we ask is what kinds of ﬁrms and what kinds of alliances observe the
greatest effects. A straightforward approach to answering such a question is to interact the
alliance variable with variables that capture important ﬁrm and pair characteristics, as we
do next. Note that we do not include the self-pairs in the estimation in this subsection,
because our main focus here is the variation in alliance effects.
The results of tests with interaction terms are presented in Table 4. Because a number of
the effects of interest would drop out, we do not use the ﬁxed effects approach here.
Rather, we use the random effects estimator, which in principle is more efﬁcient, and which
is also more conservative than OLS in the sense that it seems to generally give smaller
alliance effects. The ﬁrst column (Model 5A) merely re-estimates Model 5 in Table 3 to
show that excluding the self pairs and moving to the smaller Compustat sample yields the
same basic story as regressions with the main analysis sample. The effect of the intensive
alliance variable is estimated at 30%, compared to 28% in the larger sample. Other
estimates change only slightly with increases in the effects of technological proximity (from
1.2 to 1.7) and geographic proximity (from 0.17 to 0.36), but the qualitative picture is
similar.
Model 6 includes ﬁrst-order (i.e., not interacted with alliance) effects of three sets of
variables: (1) Firm sizes for each of the ﬁrms, measured by the log of citing- and cited-ﬁrm
sales revenues; (2) R&D intensities for each of the ﬁrms, measured by the R&D-to-sales
ratios of the citing and cited ﬁrms; and, (3) market proximity of the ﬁrms, measured by a
dummy that is unity if Compustat reports the ﬁrms to be in the same three-digit SIC
industry. We use for this purpose whatever SIC is reported by Compustat. Indeed, many
ﬁrms are assigned a three-digit SIC. For ﬁrms whose operations span multiple industries,
Compustat assigns three-digit SIC numbers that sometimes are in effect two-digit SICs.
That is, a company with activities in multiple sectors of the chemical industry are assigned
SIC 280. Thus, as for the same region dummy, this same SIC dummy is crude. Except for
market proximity, these variables do not have important ﬁrst-order effects. Most are
statistically insigniﬁcant. The effect of the size of the citing ﬁrm is statistically signiﬁcant,
but the coefﬁcient is negligibly small (it implies an elasticity of citations with respect to size
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Table 4
Variation of the alliance effect with characteristics of paired ﬁrms
To estimate how the alliance effect varies with characteristics of citing and cited ﬁrms, we use the Compustat
sample of 8,917 pair-years and Random Effects regressions. The dependent variable is the log of the number of
citations from citing ﬁrm to cited ﬁrm in year t. Independent variables are: total citations of citing ﬁrm in year t;
patent stock of cited ﬁrm in year t; percent of patents of cited ﬁrm that are less than 3 years old; percent of patents
of cited ﬁrm that are between 3 and 7 years old; technological proximity of citing and cited ﬁrms; a dummy equal
to one if ﬁrms in the pair are from the same geographic region (U.S., Europe, Japan, Rest of World); a dummy
equal to one if the ﬁrms had an intensive alliance (see text, Section 4.1); a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrms are in
the same 3-digit SIC industry; the log of the citing ﬁrm’s sales; the log of the cited ﬁrm’s sales; the percentage of
R&D in sales of the citing ﬁrm; and, the percentage of R&D in sales of the cited ﬁrm. Interaction terms of
intensive alliance and the ﬁrm characteristics are used in one model. To interpret the combined effects of these
interactions and enable comparison across models, the effect of an intensive alliance is calculated at sample
means. The different models shown are: Model 5A uses the list of variables from Model 5 from Table 2, but on the
Compustat sample; Model 6 adds ﬁrm characteristics as independent variables; and, Model 7 adds the interaction
terms. Standard errors are in parentheses. Full set of year dummies are included in the regressions, but are not
shown here.
Dependent variable: log of no. of citations from citing to cited
ﬁrm in t
Model 5A Model 6 Model 7





[ln(Total citations of citing ﬁrm in t)]










[ln(Patent stock of cited ﬁrm in t)]





% Cited stock o3 years old in t  0.043  0.073  0.087
(0.066) (0.069) (0.069)




























Log cited ﬁrm’s sales: size 0.016 0.013
(0.013) (0.013)
Citing ﬁrm’s R&D per sales  0.173  0.313
(0.260) (0.263)
Cited ﬁrm’s R&D per sales 0.061 0.138
(0.257) (0.260)
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smaller than those of geographic and technological proximity; ﬁrms in the same industry
are about 10% more likely to cite each other, all else equal. Addition of these variables
does not change the estimated magnitude of the effect of having an intensive alliance,
which remains at about 30%.
Model 7 interacts the summary measure indicating an intensive alliance with all of these
ﬁrm and pair characteristics. Once these interactions are added, the coefﬁcient on the
alliance-intensity variable itself loses economic interpretation, because it represents the
effect of an intensive alliance when all of the interacted variables have values of zero,
including the log of sales. In order to estimate the complete alliance effect in this model,
one must add together the coefﬁcient on the alliance variable, plus the coefﬁcients on each
interaction multiplied by plausible values for each of the interacted variables. The last row
in the list of independent variables in Table 4 shows the result of such a calculation with all
of the interacted variables set to their sample means. Of course, for the models with no
interactions, the entry in this row is just the coefﬁcient on the intensive alliance variable
itself. But in Model 7, the overall calculated effect of intensive alliance drops to 10% and is
no longer statistically signiﬁcant. This result suggests that while, on average, the alliance
effect is large and positive (we know this from Model 6), this average effect comes virtually
entirely from the ﬁrms with certain attributes. This total marginal effect of an intensive
alliance is calculated by setting all other independent variables to their sample means.
When we use the means conditional on there being an intensive alliance instead, the




Dependent variable: log of no. of citations from citing to cited
ﬁrm in t
Model 5A Model 6 Model 7
Same 3-digit SIC 0.232
(0.076)
***
Log citing ﬁrm’s sales: size 0.096
(0.031)
***
Log cited ﬁrm’s sales: size 0.132
(0.031)
***
Citing ﬁrm’s R&D per sales 3.343
(0.865)
***
Cited ﬁrm’s R&D per sales 0.217
(0.867)
Calculation:
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variable. This means that proximity fosters citation, alliance fosters citation, and the
combination of proximity and alliance fosters citation more than additively. Put another
way, the beneﬁt to knowledge ﬂow from forming an alliance is greatest for pairs of ﬁrms
that are also proximate, despite the fact that such proximity already fosters knowledge
ﬂows in nonallied pairs. We review the interaction coefﬁcients ﬁrst, and then offer a broad
explanation.
The interaction effect between intensive alliance and technological proximity is about
43%. This can be compared to the pure alliance effect of about 33%. As before, it is useful
to interpret this in terms of comparing pairs at the lower and upper ends of the
interquartile range of technological proximity. Allying with a partner at the lower end
increases citation frequency by about 44% (33% plus 0.25 of 43%); allying with a partner
at the upper end of the interquartile range increases citation frequency by about 67% (33%
plus 0.75 of 43%).
The estimated coefﬁcients for geographic and market proximity are smaller, but because
the plausible range of these variables is larger, their real impact is comparable. That is,
while there are virtually no ﬁrms with technological proximity of zero or unity, the
difference between ‘‘same region’’ and ‘‘different region’’ is, in fact, unity. The coefﬁcient
of 0.34 on the same-region dummy implies that a ﬁrm in an intensive alliance with a
partner in its home region is twice as likely to cite its partner as it would be if it were in an
equivalent alliance with a foreign partner (33% plus 34% compared to the sole effect of
33%). The effect of the interaction of same-SIC and intensive alliance is somewhat smaller
at about 23%; this implies that an alliance with a ﬁrm in the same industry increases
citations by a little over 50%, compared with about one-third for ﬁrms not in the same
industry.
There are also interaction effects between the intensive-alliance variable and
size variables, which we measure here by ﬁrm revenues (recall that sizes of patent
stocks are already in the controls). The coefﬁcients on both of these interaction
terms imply elasticities of 10% to 13%, meaning that a ﬁrm in an intensive alliance will
cite its partner this much more for every doubling of revenue either of themselves or their
partner.
Theory or existing literature does not provide prior expectation about these interaction
effects of technological proximity, geographic proximity, and ﬁrm size. We suspect that
further work and modeling is needed to pin down their meaning. For now, however, we
interpret these results as indicating an opening of the ﬂoodgates to knowledge ﬂows when
ﬁrms engage in intensive alliances. The managerial literature has many examples of
alliances that grew beyond their initial intents because the partners encouraged the free
ﬂow of people, information, and ideas across ﬁrm boundaries (see, e.g., the case of Xerox
and Fuji Xerox in Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Narrow, single-point, one-shot alliances are
unlikely to lead to such broad collaboration, nor is incidental contact between unallied
ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the concerted management effort involved in large, intensive alliances
may well have such snowball effects, in which case ﬁrms that have a lot in common are
likely to beneﬁt more from the increased ﬂows of knowledge than other ﬁrms; this could
explain the interaction with technological and geographic proximity. Furthermore,
partners that have large portfolios of businesses in which to apply each other’s technology
may also beneﬁt more from broad collaboration than other ﬁrms; this could explain the
interaction with citing- and cited-ﬁrm size.
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also interesting, and seems consistent with a major strand of the literature on
organizational learning. Unlike the size effects, the R&D-intensity effects are asymmetric:
R&D intensity of citing ﬁrms is strongly correlated with increased citations in intensive
alliances (statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of 3.3), but R&D intensity of the cited ﬁrm is
not correlated at all (the much smaller coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant).
A different explanation applies to each side of this knowledge ﬂow story. It is not too
surprising that there is no interaction effect for cited-ﬁrm R&D, because the impact of this
R&D is already captured in the control variables that measure the size and age of the stock
of citable patents, which represent the direct output of this R&D. But the R&D of the
citing ﬁrm could also have a different effect—it could help the citing ﬁrm absorb external
technology, aside from its role in generating new technology within the ﬁrm (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989). As a general rule, if R&D encourages internal development more than
absorption of external technology, then we would expect a negative effect on citation
frequency; otherwise, we would expect the reverse. Our results suggest that at least in
intensive alliances, the absorption effect of R&D dominates, while the reverse is true for
nonallied pairs, weakly allied pairs, and internal to the ﬁrm. Put more strongly,
participation in an intensive alliance could act to release partners from the well-known not
invented here syndrome, and encourage them to devote more effort to absorbing a
partner’s technology.
5. Conclusion
As a whole, our analysis is consistent with expectations about how alliances affect
knowledge ﬂows; it also yields new conclusions that are potentially important to managers
and raises questions that deserve further work.
Before summarizing these conclusions, we should acknowledge one limitation of our
research. We ﬁnd a positive correlation between the existence of an alliance and citation
rates, and based on the weight and variety of the evidence, we conclude that alliances in
fact promote citations. But there is a chance that these results also reﬂect reverse
causation—a tendency for higher citations rates between two ﬁrms to lead them to form an
alliance. In separate tests not shown here we explore this problem with instrumental
variables models, but we ﬁnd no reliable determinants of alliance formation that do not
also determine citation likelihood. Even so, our results suggest that even where the effect of
alliance is lower than in the tables shown here, it is generally still positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. In a related project, Megan MacGarvie uses a matched-pair approach to
disentangle these effects. In unpublished preliminary results, she ﬁnds that, indeed, pairs
that form alliances do tend to have a slightly higher-than-average citation rate than other
ﬁrms, but this rate increases after alliance formation more rapidly than in matched pairs
that remain unallied. In her analysis, she cannot compare these results with self-citations.
Despite this limitation, we believe that our study is consistent with expectations in the
literature regarding the extent of knowledge ﬂows in different organizational arrange-
ments. As one moves from the loosest organizational arrangement to the tightest, the
likelihood of knowledge ﬂows increases; citation probability is higher for alliances than for
nonallied ﬁrms, and is higher for partners internal to the ﬁrm than those within alliances.
Our various tests with different forms of alliance relationships are also consistent with this
ﬁnding: Speciﬁcally, partners that have many alliances, relatively recent alliances, and
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have fewer, older, or less-involved alliances. This reinforces our conception of the
difference between ﬁrms and alliance pairs as a matter of degree, not of kind, at least as
regards ﬂows of technological knowledge.
By extension, one implication of our results is that the narrow deﬁnition of the ﬁrm may
not be the best unit for economic and business analyses in some situations. There is an
emerging view that the legal deﬁnition of the ﬁrm is sometimes at odds with the economic
deﬁnition (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). For instance, scandals over Enron’s special
purpose entities are a well-cited manifestation of this problem or, more positively, many
large ﬁrms have come to depend on alliances for a large part of their sales or supplies. In
essence, these ﬁrms create webs of relationships that are just as important to their
competitive success as are some of their internal, wholly owned assets. Our conclusions
suggest similar tendencies with respect to research activities. The resources that these ﬁrms
tap into when developing new knowledge extend beyond their legal boundaries and beyond
their home bases, even though the channels for tapping these sources may vary in
effectiveness. Perhaps a ﬁrm is still a ﬁrm, but the relevant unit of inventive activity may be
better deﬁned by knowledge ﬂow boundaries that cut across the organizational and
geographic landscape.
We ﬁnd interesting new results when exploring how the likelihood of knowledge ﬂow
varies with different kinds of alliance pairs. Aside from the intensity (or structure) of an
alliance, knowledge ﬂows seem to be affected by characteristics of the partners, in
particular, their technological and business ﬁt to their geographic origins and their sizes.
These differential effects are potentially important to managers. We mention above the
role of managerial decisions regarding alliance structure and intensity; our results show
that managerial decisions regarding partner choice are equally important. We ﬁnd that
alliances can bridge technological and geographic differences between ﬁrms. However, we
also ﬁnd that similarities between partner capabilities and origins tend to promote
knowledge ﬂows within alliances; the effects of interactions between alliance and our
measures of technological, geographic, and business-segment proximity are all positive.
Indeed, because the effect of alliance formation on knowledge ﬂows depends on the ﬁrms’
underlying proximity and other characteristics, the results imply that mismatched ﬁrms
may not succeed in increasing knowledge ﬂows through alliance formation. These ﬁndings
have direct managerial implications.
Our results leave some other important managerial questions unanswered. For a ﬁrm
that seeks to enhance its technological position, is it better to select a partner similar to
itself because the knowledge ﬂows within the alliance would be enhanced? Or, is it better
for the ﬁrm to select a dissimilar ﬁrm, because the potential for learning something truly
new could be greater, notwithstanding the likelihood of lesser ﬂows overall? The current
study is not set up to answer this question, but we hope to address it in future work.
Finally, our study leads to the broad conclusion that alliances and knowledge ﬂows both
demand effort and investment to succeed, with a possible corollary that this success can
snowball under the right conditions. We mention just above how intensive alliances yield
more beneﬁt than simpler, narrower alliances. It is well known that an intensive alliance
relationship demands management time and effort (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Bamford et al.,
2003). In the case of knowledge ﬂows, this effort is sometimes counted as R&D, but it is
R&D of a different kind than the traditional one as it is aimed at learning, adopting, and
applying the partner’s technology. Indeed, we ﬁnd that R&D by citing ﬁrms (the receivers
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that this effort can open up greater opportunities than perhaps originally foreseen; this is
one interpretation of the positive interaction between ﬁrm size and alliance. Again, these
results are suggestive and there is ample room for further work.
Appendix
Deﬁnitions of main variables
Variable Name Description Source
*
No. of citations from
citing to cited ﬁrm in t
For patents granted to citing ﬁrm in year t,
number of citations to existing patents of
cited ﬁrm
USPTO
Total citations of citing
ﬁrm in t
Total citations in all patents granted to citing
ﬁrm in year t
USPTO
Patent stock of cited
ﬁrm in t
Total number of patents granted to cited ﬁrm
in years 1975 to t
USPTO
% Cited stocko3 years
old in t
Percent of cited ﬁrm’s patent stock that
consists of patents that are less than 3 years
old as of year t
USPTO
% Cited stock 3–7 years
old in t
Percent of cited ﬁrm’s patent stock that
consists of patents between 3 and 7 years old




Index of technological proximity (see text) USPTO
Same region Dummy equal to 1 if country of citing and
cited ﬁrm are in same region, where regions
are deﬁned as U.S., Europe, Japan, and Rest
of World
CATI
Self-citation Dummy equal to 1 if citing ﬁrm is the same as
cited ﬁrm
1 if ﬁrms had alliance in
or before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had at least one
alliance in or before year t
CATI
1 if allianceo3 years
before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had at least one
alliance fewer than three years before year t
CATI
1 if alliance 3–5 years
before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had at least one
alliance 3 to 5 years before year t
CATI
1 if alliance 6+ years
before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had at least one
alliance 6 or more years before year t
CATI
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before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had 1 or 2 alliances
in or before year t
CATI
1 if 3–6 alliances in or
before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had 3 to 6 alliances
in or before year t
CATI
1 if 7+ alliances in or
before t
Dummy equal to 1 if pair had 7 or more
alliances in or before year t
CATI
1 if joint R&D in an
alliance before t
Dummy equal to 1 if any alliance between the
ﬁrms in or before year t was structured as a
joint R&D agreement
CATI
1 if equity in an alliance
before t
Dummy equal to 1 if any alliance between the
ﬁrms in or before year t included equity
investment
CATI
Intensive alliance Dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrms have three
alliances AND any of the alliances involved
equity or joint R&D in or before t
CATI
Same 3-digit SIC Dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrms have same 3-
digit SIC segment
Compustat
Log citing ﬁrm’s sales:
size
Log of citing ﬁrm revenues in year t Compustat
Log cited ﬁrm’s sales:
size
Log of cited ﬁrm revenues in year t Compustat
Citing ﬁrm’s R&D per
sales
R&D expenditures divided by revenues for
citing ﬁrm in year t
Compustat
Cited ﬁrm’s R&D per
sales
R&D expenditures divided by revenues for
cited ﬁrm in year t
Compustat
*Sources are described in the text: USPTO ¼ U.S. Patent Ofﬁce database of U.S. patents; CATI ¼ Cooperative
Agreements and Technology Indicators database of technology alliances developed by Maastricht Economic
Research Institute in Technology; Compustat ¼ Standard and Poors Compustat database of ﬁnancial and
operating data.
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